-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
Cisco Security Response: SIP User Directory Information
Disclosure
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sr-20
060802-sip.shtml
Revision 1.0
For Public Release 2006 August 02 1600 UTC (GMT)
-
------------------------------------------------------------
---------
Contents
========
Cisco Response
Additional Information
Revision History
Cisco Security Procedures
-
------------------------------------------------------------
---------
Cisco Response
==============
This is the Cisco PSIRT response to the statements made by
Dave
Endler and Mark Collier in their presentation, 'Hacking
Voice over IP
(VoIP) Exposed' at BlackHat USA 2006.
We would like to thank Dave Endler for reporting this issue
to us.
We greatly appreciate the opportunity to work with
researchers on
security vulnerabilities, and welcome the opportunity to
review and
assist in product reports.
This issue is currently being tracked by Cisco bug ID
CSCse92417 for
IOS CallManager Express (CME).
Cisco CallManager has been tested and is not vulnerable to
this
attack.
Additional Information
======================
The attacks described in the report attempt to manipulate
the Session
Initiation Protocol (SIP) stack in various voice products to
gain
information from the SIP user directory. By sending various
SIP
messages to the VoIP infrastructure, an attacker can
discover the
names of the users stored in the SIP user database.
It is important to note that the attacks described do not
disrupt
VoIP call processing or voice mail access.
Cisco's recommended best practice of implementing the VoIP
infrastructure and data devices on separate VLANs would
prevent
malicious users from launching such attacks against the VoIP
network.
Please consult the following links for other recommendations
and
guidelines for securing IP telephony networks:
* Enhanced Security for Unified Communications
http://www.cisco.com/
en/US/netsol/ns340/ns394/ns165/ns391/networking_solutions_pa
ckage.html
* Cisco Unified Voice Security
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/sw/voicesw/ps556/p
roducts_implementation_design_guide_chapter09186a008063742b.
html
Cisco was made aware of this issue on July 20, 2006. We are
continuing to investigate this issue and will update this
document as
additional information becomes available.
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS
AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY
KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF
THE
INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE
DOCUMENT IS
AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR
UPDATE THIS
DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
Revision History
================
+---------------------------------------+
| Revision | | Initial |
| 1.0 | 2006-August-02 | public |
| | | release. |
+---------------------------------------+
Cisco Security Procedures
=========================
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities
in Cisco
products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and
registering to receive security information from Cisco, is
available
on Cisco's worldwide website at
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/produ
cts/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html.
This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding
Cisco
security notices. All Cisco security advisories are
available at
http://www.cisco.com/g
o/psirt.
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.4.2.2 (SunOS)
iD8DBQFE0M6O8NUAbBmDaxQRAuTLAJ4oIdLZtOPjhFKL9+dqKu1DiksoTQCe
NubU
MQ1YNHSEdWfYZOcUR0FBTgs=
=TzE8
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
|