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Cisco Security Advisory: Multiple Vulnerabilities in 802.1X Supplicant
user name
2007-02-21 11:20:26
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Cisco Security Advisory: Multiple Vulnerabilities in 802.1X
Supplicant

Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20070221-supplicant

http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisc
o-sa-20070221-supplicant.shtml

Revision 1.0

For Public Release 2007 February 21 1600 UTC (GMT)

-
------------------------------------------------------------
-----------

Summary
=======

The Cisco Secure Services Client (CSSC) is a software client
that
enables customers to deploy a single authentication
framework using the
802.1X authentication standard across multiple device types
to access
both wired and wireless networks. A lightweight version of
the CSSC
client is also a component of the Cisco Trust Agent (CTA)
within the
Cisco Network Admission Control (NAC) Framework solution.

These products are affected by multiple vulnerabilities
including
privilege escalations and information disclosure.

Cisco has made free software available to address these
vulnerabilities
for affected customers.

This advisory is posted at 
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cis
co-sa-20070221-supplicant.shtml.

Affected Products
=================

This section provides details on affected products.

Vulnerable Products
+------------------

Any version of the following software clients, prior to the
versions
which are listed in the Software Versions and Fixes section
below, may
be vulnerable.

  * Cisco Secure Services Client 4.x versions
  * Cisco Trust Agent 1.x and 2.x versions
  * Meetinghouse AEGIS SecureConnect Client (Windows
platform versions)
  * Cisco Security Agent (CSA) bundle versions 5.0 and 5.1

To determine the version of the Cisco Trust Agent installed,
the
"ctastat" command found in the

Program FilesCisco SystemsCiscoTrustAgent

directory will provide output similar to:

    Cisco Trust Agent Statistics
    Current Time: Tue Sep 27 19:11:18 2005
    CTA Version: 2.0.0.26


To determine the version of the Cisco Secure Services Client
installed,
the software version information may be found in
"About" dialog window
which may be launched underneath the Help tab within the
client.

Cisco Security Agent bundle versions 5.0 and 5.1 included
Cisco Trust
Agent software within the bundle. Customers who have
deployed CTA as
part of their CSA client package may be vulnerable if the
version of
CTA included is a version which is affected.

Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
+--------------------------------

No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected
by these
vulnerabilities.

Details
=======

The Cisco Secure Services Client (CSSC) is a software client
that
enables customers to deploy a single authentication
framework using the
802.1X authentication standard across multiple device types
to access
both wired and wireless networks. Previously this product
was marketed
as the Meetinghouse AEGIS SecureConnect client.

Cisco Trust Agent (CTA) installed on end-hosts is a core
component of
the Cisco Network Admission Control (NAC) Framework
solution. CTA
optionally includes a lightweight version of CSSC to
provide
authentication as part of the NAC Framework solution, using
the network
infrastructure to enforce security policy compliance on all
devices
seeking to access network computing resources.

Both products are affected by multiple vulnerabilities
including
privilege escalations and password disclosure.

Privilege Escalations
+--------------------

Four privilege escalation vulnerabilities exist in both
products.

  * It is possible for an unprivileged user who is logged
into the
    computer to increase their privileges to the local
system user via
    the help facility within the supplicant Graphical User
Interface
    (GUI). This vulnerability is documented by Cisco Bug ID
CSCsf14120
  * An unprivileged user who is logged into the computer is
able to
    launch any program on a system to run with SYSTEM
privileges from
    within the supplicant application. This vulnerability is
documented
    by Cisco Bug ID CSCsf15836 
  * Insecure default Discretionary Access Control Lists
(DACL) for the
    connection client GUI (ConnectionClient.exe) allows an
unprivileged
    user to inject a thread under ConnectionClient.exe
running with
    SYSTEM level privileges. This vulnerability is
documented by Cisco
    Bug ID CSCsg20558 
  * Due to the method used in parsing commands, it is
possible that an
    unprivileged user who is logged into the computer could
launch a
    process as the local system user. This vulnerability is
documented
    by Cisco Bug IDs CSCsh30297 and CSCsh30624

Password Disclosure
+------------------

With authentication methods which convey a password in a
protected
tunnel the users password will be logged in cleartext in
the
application log files described below (assuming default
installation
paths). This will occur with the following methods:

  * TTLS CHAP
  * TTLS MSCHAP
  * TTLS MSCHAPv2
  * TTLS PAP
  * MD5
  * GTC
  * LEAP
  * PEAP MSCHAPv2
  * PEAP GTC
  * FAST

CTA Wired Client:

  * Program FilesCisco SystemsCisco Trust Agent 802_1x
Wired Client
    systemlogapiDebug_current.txt
  * Program FilesCisco SystemsCisco Trust Agent 802_1x
Wired Client
    systemlogapiDebug_1.txt
  * Program FilesCisco SystemsCisco Trust Agent 802_1x
Wired Client
    systemlogapiDebug_2.txt

Cisco Secure Services Client:

  * Program FilesCisco SystemCisco Secure Services
Client system
    logapiDebug_current.txt
  * Program FilesCisco SystemCisco Secure Services
Client system
    logapiDebug_1.txt
  * Program FilesCisco SystemCisco Secure Services
Client system
    logapiDebug_2.txt

AEGIS Secure Connect:

  * Program FilesMeetinghouseAEGIS
SecureConnectSystemlog
    apiDebug_current.txt
  * Program FilesMeetinghouseAEGIS
SecureConnectSystemlog
    apiDebug_1.txt
  * Program FilesMeetinghouseAEGIS
SecureConnectSystemlog
    apiDebug_2.txt

This log file is rotated on a regular basis and will be
recreated if
the file has been deleted.

This vulnerability is documented by Cisco Bug ID CSCsg34423


Vulnerability Scoring Details
+----------------------------

Cisco is providing scores for the vulnerabilities in this
advisory
based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).

Cisco will provide a base and temporal score. Customers can
then
compute environmental scores to assist in determining the
impact of the
vulnerability in individual networks.

Cisco PSIRT will set the bias in all cases to normal.
Customers are
encouraged to apply the bias parameter when determining the
environmental impact of a particular vulnerability.

CVSS is a standards based scoring method that conveys
vulnerability
severity and helps determine urgency and priority of
response.

Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions
regarding CVSS
at http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/in
telligence/cvss-qandas.html.

Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute
the
environmental impact for individual networks at 
http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/c
vss.


CSCsf14120: Privilege escalation vulnerability via Help
facility

CVSS Base Score: 5.6
    Access Vector: Local
    Access Complexity: High
    Authentication: Not Required
    Confidentiality Impact: Complete
    Integrity Impact: Complete
    Availability Impact: Complete
    Impact Bias: Normal

CVSS Temporal Score: 4.6
    Exploitability: Functional
    Remediation Level: Official Fix
    Report Confidence: Confirmed



CSCsf15836: Privilege escalation vulnerability via web
browser

CVSS Base Score: 7
    Access Vector: Local
    Access Complexity: Low
    Authentication: Not Required
    Confidentiality Impact: Complete
    Integrity Impact: Complete
    Availability Impact: Complete
    Impact Bias: Normal

CVSS Temporal Score: 5.8
    Exploitability: Functional
    Remediation Level: Official Fix
    Report Confidence: Confirmed



CSCsg20558: ConnectionClient.exe vulnerable to Local
Privilege Escalation

CVSS Base Score: 7
    Access Vector: Local
    Access Complexity: Low
    Authentication: Not Required
    Confidentiality Impact: Complete
    Integrity Impact: Complete
    Availability Impact: Complete
    Impact Bias: Normal

CVSS Temporal Score: 5.8
    Exploitability: Functional
    Remediation Level: Official Fix
    Report Confidence: Confirmed



CSCsh30297: Security vulnerability while launching a
process
   and
CSCsh30624: Security vulnerability while launching a
process

CVSS Base Score: 7
    Access Vector: Local
    Access Complexity: Low
    Authentication: Not Required
    Confidentiality Impact: Complete
    Integrity Impact: Complete
    Availability Impact: Complete
    Impact Bias: Normal

CVSS Temporal Score: 5.8
    Exploitability: Functional
    Remediation Level: Official Fix
    Report Confidence: Confirmed



CSCsg34423: User's password written to log file

CVSS Base Score: 1.6 
    Access Vector: Local
    Access Complexity: Low
    Authentication: Not Required
    Confidentiality Impact: Partial
    Integrity Impact: None
    Availability Impact: None
    Impact Bias: Normal

CVSS Temporal Score: 1.3
    Exploitability: Functional
    Remediation Level: Official Fix
    Report Confidence: Confirmed


Impact
======

Successful exploitation of any one of the four privilege
escalation
vulnerabilities may result in a user gaining privilege to
run programs,
read or modify files, or otherwise damage the integrity,
confidentiality, and availability of the system.

If any of the authentication methods described earlier is
employed,
then a user who can access the apiDebug_current.txt file or
previous
copies of this file created via normal log rotation may see
passwords
of other users in cleartext, enabling them to impersonate
and
authenticate as those users gaining the privilege and
identity of the
compromised user account.

Software Version and Fixes
==========================

When considering software upgrades, also consult
http://www.cisco.com/go
/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine
exposure and a complete upgrade solution.

In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be
certain the
devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that
current
hardware and software configurations will continue to be
supported
properly by the new release. If the information is not
clear, contact
the Cisco Technical Assistance Center ("TAC") or
your contracted
maintenance provider for assistance.

The table below lists the first fixed releases for each
specific
vulnerability. Customers wishing to get all of the fixes may
simply
download CTA version 2.1.103.0 or CSSC version 4.0.51.5192.

+-----------------------------------------------------------
--+
|    Category    |      BugID       | Product |  First Fixed
 |
|                |                  |         |   Releases  
 |
|----------------+------------------+---------+-------------
--|
|                |                  | CTA     | 2.1.18.0    
 |
|                | CSCsf14120      
|---------+---------------|
|                |                  | CSSC    | 4.0.51.5192 
 |
|               
|------------------+---------+---------------|
|                |                  | CTA     | 2.1.18.0    
 |
|                | CSCsf15836      
|---------+---------------|
| Privilege      |                  | CSSC    | 4.0.51.5192 
 |
| Escalations   
|------------------+---------+---------------|
|                |                  | CTA     | 2.1.103.0   
 |
|                | CSCsg20558      
|---------+---------------|
|                |                  | CSSC    | 4.0.51.5192 
 |
|               
|------------------+---------+---------------|
|                | CSCsh30297 and   | CTA     | 2.1.103.0   
 |
|                | CSCsh30624      
|---------+---------------|
|                |                  | CSSC    | 4.0.51.5192 
 |
|----------------+------------------+---------+-------------
--|
| Password       |                  | CTA     | 2.1.103.0   
 |
| Disclosures    | CSCsg34423      
|---------+---------------|
|                |                  | CSSC    | 4.0.51.5192 
 |
+-----------------------------------------------------------
--+

Workarounds
===========

There are no workarounds available for the privilege
escalation
vulnerabilities.

The password disclosure vulnerability may be temporarily
mitigated by
deleting the current apidebug_current.txt file and previous
versions of
the file. This workaround is only temporary as those files
will be
automatically recreated by the application.

Obtaining Fixed Software
========================

Cisco will make free software available to address these
vulnerabilities for affected customers. This advisory will
be updated
as fixed software becomes available. Prior to deploying
software,
customers should consult their maintenance provider or check
the
software for feature set compatibility and known issues
specific to
their environment.

Customers may only install and expect support for the
feature
sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading,
accessing
or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree
to
be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms
found
at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-license-agreement.html,
or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at
http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml.


Do not contact either "psirtcisco.com" or
"security-alertcisco.com"
for software upgrades.

Customers with Service Contracts
+-------------------------------

Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software
through their
regular update channels. For most customers, this means that
upgrades
should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's
worldwide
website at http://www.cisco.com.

Customers using Third Party Support Organizations
+------------------------------------------------

Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained
through prior
or existing agreement with third-party support organizations
such as
Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers
should
contact that support organization for guidance and
assistance with the
appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory.

The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on
specific
customer situations such as product mix, network topology,
traffic
behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of
affected
products and releases, customers should consult with their
service
provider or support organization to ensure any applied
workaround or
fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network
before it
is deployed.

Customers without Service Contracts
+----------------------------------

Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but who do not hold
a Cisco
service contract and customers who purchase through
third-party vendors
but are unsuccessful at obtaining fixed software through
their point of
sale should get their upgrades by contacting the Cisco
Technical
Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows.

  * +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
  * +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
  * e-mail: taccisco.com

Have your product serial number available and give the URL
of this
notice as evidence of your entitlement to a free upgrade.
Free upgrades
for non-contract customers must be requested through the
TAC.

Refer to http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC
.shtml
for additional TAC contact information, including special
localized
telephone numbers and instructions and e-mail addresses for
use in
various languages.

Exploitation and Public Announcements
=====================================

The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or
malicious
use of the vulnerability described in this advisory.

Two of these vulnerabilities were reported to Cisco by a
customer. The
others were found internally.

Status of this Notice: FINAL
============================

THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND
DOES NOT IMPLY ANY
KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF
THE
INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE
DOCUMENT IS AT
YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE
THIS
DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.

A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this
document that
omits the distribution URL in the following section is an
uncontrolled
copy, and may lack important information or contain factual
errors.

Distribution
============

This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at :

http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisc
o-sa-20070221-supplicant.shtml

In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this
notice is
clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to
the
following e-mail and Usenet news recipients.

  * cust-security-announcecisco.com
  * first-teamsfirst.org
  * bugtraqsecurityfocus.com
  * vulnwatchvulnwatch.org
  * ciscospot.colorado.edu
  * cisco-nsppuck.nether.net
  * full-disclosurelists.grok.org.uk
  * comp.dcom.sys.cisconewsgate.cisco.com

Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on
Cisco's
worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced
on mailing
lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are
encouraged
to check the above URL for any updates.

Revision History
================

+-----------------------------------------------------------
--+
| Revision 1.0  | 2007-February-21  | Initial public release
 |
+-----------------------------------------------------------
--+

Cisco Security Procedures
=========================

Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities
in Cisco
products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and
registering
to receive security information from Cisco, is available on
Cisco's
worldwide website at 
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/produ
cts/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html.
This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding
Cisco
security notices. All Cisco security advisories are
available at
http://www.cisco.com/g
o/psirt.

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All contents are Copyright 2006-2007 Cisco Systems, Inc. All
rights
reserved. 
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Updated: Feb 21, 2007                               
Document ID: 81676

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