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List Info
Thread: Re: multiple licenses of same image
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| Re: multiple licenses of same image |
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2007-01-26 15:36:25 |
On Friday 26 January 2007 04:30 pm, Dana Powers wrote:
> The proposed argument:
>
> 1) simple transformations (like taping a radio
broadcast) infringe the
> reproduction right, not the derivative work right
> 2) therefore creation of a simple transformation is a
"reproduction" not a
> "derivative"
> 3) and also therefore licensing a work for reproduction
necessarily implies
> licensing all simple transformations
>
> this is a straw man. i don't think anyone disputes
that licensing a work
> under CC-ND still allows a user to do simple
transformations - compression,
> for example. this should be uncontroversial.
>
> the question is whether a user with a license to
reproduce a work may
> freely copy anyone else's simple transformations
without obtaining extra
> permission. the fallacy in the above argument is the
assertion that a
> "reproduction" will not contain additional
creative expression. This is
> simply not true (in the U.S. at least). Take movie
soundtracks, for
> example. In order to put music in a movie, the
producer has to get a sync
> license, which is a license to reproduce the work in
synchronization with
> the movie. Although this constitutes a reproduction it
doesn't imply that
> the movie as a whole is not also independently
copyrightable.
>
> The distinction an infringement of the reproduction
right and an
> infringement of the derivative work right is simply not
the issue here.
> What we are interested in, rather, is whether a higher
resolution work has
> additional creative expression which is protectable
under copyright law.
> Because it is so easy to reach this threshold in the
U.S., I believe it
> does.
If it does work this way, should it then be registered as a
separate work?
>
> I should also mention that White-Smith was a case about
whether piano rolls
> were protected by copyright as reproductions of a
musical work. The court
> ruled that they were unprotected because they were not
plainly perceivable
> by a human as the original work. But this human
perception test has been
> overturned by statute. See Apple Computer v. Franklin
Computer, 714
> F.2d1240 at 1248 (
> 3d.Cir. 1983); 17 USC 102. Moreover, the White-Smith
decision occurred
> well before the current derivative work right was
enacted in 1976.
>
> Dana
>
> On 1/26/07, drew Roberts <zotz 100jamz.com> wrote:
> > On Friday 26 January 2007 01:56 pm, Peter Brink
wrote:
> > > Sorry for the late reply...
> > >
> > > Terry Hancock skrev:
> > > > Peter Brink wrote:
> > > >> A "work" must be the
result of a creative act - the same
> > > >> goes for derivative works. A
mechanical transformation is in itself
> > > >> not a creative act, the result of
such a transformation is a copy
> >
> > and
> >
> > > >> not a derivative work. If I scan a
picture and make two versions
> > > >> available, one in low resolution
and one in high resolution, those
> > > >> two images are _copies_ of the
_same work_.
> > > >
> > > > Perhaps so. This seems like a
plausible, but debatable legal theory.
> > > > Can we clarify what jurisdiction(s) you
feel this applies to? Your
> > > > email address suggests Sweden (at least
that's what I think "se" is,
> > > > please correct me if I'm wrong).
> > >
> > > What we are talking about here is really what
it takes for a thing to
> > > be a copy of a work. Common to (almost) all
jurisdictions is that a
> > > copy is a reproduction, in any form, of the
work (see also art. 9.1 of
> > > the Berne Convention). Then what is a
reproduction? In the U.S. case
> > > White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co. (209
U.S. 1 (1908)) the
> > > concept of a copy was defined as follows:
"[a] copy is that which comes
> > > so near to the original as to give to every
person seeing it the idea
> > > created by the original". Substitute
"seeing" with "perceiving" and you
> > > get a statement with global relevance.
> > >
> > > It's pretty obvious (to me at least) that if
a radio station plays a
> > > piece of music, using a high quality copy,
and a listener tapes that
> > > piece, then the listener has created a copy
of the music played by the
> > > radio station. That the tape copy is of lower
quality, i.e. that
> > > information was lost when the music was
transmitted using radio waves,
> > > is really of no consequence. The file used by
the radio station and the
> > > file on tape may not identical and to a
computer they may appear to be
> > > different objects but to a person they are
still copies of the same
> > > work – and that's what matters. Every
person hearing the copy played by
> > > the radio station and then hearing the copy
on tape would say that they
> > > have heard the same piece of music.
> > >
> > > Just modifying a work a bit is not enough to
turn it into a derivative
> > > work. If you have a low-resolution digital
copy of a painting, and add
> > > information so that the result is a
medium-resolution image, that every
> > > person seeing it would say is the same
picture as the painting, then
> > > you still have a copy. It doesn't matter that
you have used skill or
> > > made choices to produce the medium-resolution
image – if it appears to
> > > be the same picture as the painting to an
objective viewer, then it's a
> > > copy.
> > >
> > > Then, when does a thing quits being a copy
and becomes an adaptation
> > > (or a derivative work)? It must be pointed
out that it's very difficult
> > > to provide hard and fast rules for when a
work is a copy and when it
> > > has been transformed so much that it's a
derivative. This is something
> > > that courts decide on a case by case basis.
As a general rule there
> > > must be a difference between the original and
the adaptation and this
> > > difference must be perceivable by an
objective person. In civil law
> > > jurisdictions an adaptation must be the
result of a creative act, it
> > > obviously needs not be as original as the
original work, but there must
> > > be some creativity involved in the formation
of the work. In the U.S. a
> > > derivative work must (in theory) be
substantially different from the
> > > underlying work. The Feist decision would
seem to imply that derivative
> > > works need to be the result of a minimum of
creativity in the US too,
> > > but that might be a false assumption on my
part.
> > >
> > > In any case, in all jurisdictions the amount
of difference needed
> > > depends on a) what kind (or type) of work we
are talking about and also
> > > b) on how (relatively speaking) original the
work is. A highly original
> > > work has in general a wider scope of
protection as compared to a work
> > > of low originality. It takes more to create a
derivative based on a
> > > piece of "art music" then it takes
to create a derivative based on, or
> > > even an original work inspired by, a piece of
pop music.
> > >
> > > The scope of protection afforded to a work
must however end somewhere.
> > > At some point a derivative must cease to be a
derivative and become a
> > > new original work, otherwise the formation of
new works would be
> > > seriously hampered. This problem is solved
differently in different
> > > jurisdictions. There is a US case where an
artist based a set of
> > > sculptures on a photo. The court found that
the sculptures where
> > > derivatives of the photo. A Swedish court
would, I think it's safe to
> > > say, find it obvious that when someone
transforms a work from two to
> > > three dimensions the result is a new
independent work. The opposite is
> > > not true however; a photo of a sculpture is a
copy not a derivative
> > > under Swedish law.
> > >
> > > A personal observation is that US courts
seems to take the commercial
> > > value of a work into consideration when
assessing its scope of
> > > protection. That is not done in civil law
jurisdictions, as far as I
> > > understand. Swedish courts, for example, does
not take the monetary
> > > value of a work or the time and money
invested in making it in
> > > consideration when deciding whether a thing
is eligible of copyright
> > > protection or not. Nor do they use
investments as a factor when
> > > assessing the scope of a works protection.
> > >
> > >
> > > /Peter Brink
> >
> > So, taking this all into consideration, does this
mean you disagree with
> > Mia?
> > Or do you agree with her and I am too dim or too
ignorant at this point
> > to see it?
> >
> > all the best,
> >
> > drew
> > --
> > (da idea man)
> > National Novel Writing Month
> > Sayings (Winner 2006)
> > http://www.ourmed
ia.org/node/262954
> > _______________________________________________
> > cc-licenses mailing list
> > cc-licenseslists.ibiblio.org
> > http://lists.ibiblio.org/mailman/listinfo/cc-licenses
--
(da idea man)
National Novel Writing Month
Sayings (Winner 2006)
http://www.ourmed
ia.org/node/262954
_______________________________________________
cc-licenses mailing list
cc-licenseslists.ibiblio.org
http://lists.ibiblio.org/mailman/listinfo/cc-licenses
|
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| Re: multiple licenses of same image |
|
2007-01-26 16:01:37 |
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I can only speak hypothetically because I'm still a law student, but this is my take.
Registration is never required for copyright protection, so in that respect the answer is no.
It is usually a good idea to register if you think you'll end up in court one day. It may also be a good idea to the extent that people are trying to find you for licensing opportunities through the copyright office';s db. But in these cases I believe that a single registration will suffice. You'll still get the bonuses of registration to the extent that there is reproduction of creative expression from the registered work - which assuming the two are closely related this should be quite significant. The signaling of authorship is also unaffected as long as people can still find you in the db, which I suspect they would using a title like "photograph of duck" and "author drew roberts." Moreover, if you're using CC licensing the by-attribution is probably better anyways.
I find that the primary reason for multiple registrations is to extend copyright protection. If you make work A in 2006, and transformation B in 2030, the shared expression from A may enter the public domain before the additional expression added in B. Of course this is usually only the case in works for hire with set protection terms because standard authors get the same protection term for all works: life+70. I believe that you'll find this is the case if you search the US copyright office for movies which were originally black and white and then later "colorized" when the technology became available. I was hoping to verify this with "Casablanca," but the copyright office';s search db seems to be broken right now. oh well.
ianyal,
Dana
On 1/26/07, drew Roberts < zotz100jamz.com">zotz100jamz.com> wrote:
On Friday 26 January 2007 04:30 pm, Dana Powers wrote:
>; The proposed argument:
>
> 1) simple transformations (like taping a radio broadcast) infringe the
> reproduction right, not the derivative work right
> 2) therefore creation of a simple transformation is a "reproduction" not a
> "derivative";
> 3) and also therefore licensing a work for reproduction necessarily implies
> licensing all simple transformations
>;
> this is a straw man. i don't think anyone disputes that licensing a work
> under CC-ND still allows a user to do simple transformations - compression,
> for example. this should be uncontroversial.
>
> the question is whether a user with a license to reproduce a work may
> freely copy anyone else's simple transformations without obtaining extra
> permission. the fallacy in the above argument is the assertion that a
> "reproduction" will not contain additional creative expression. This is
> simply not true (in the U.S. at least). Take movie soundtracks, for
> example. In order to put music in a movie, the producer has to get a sync
>; license, which is a license to reproduce the work in synchronization with
> the movie. Although this constitutes a reproduction it doesn't imply that
> the movie as a whole is not also independently copyrightable.
>
> The distinction an infringement of the reproduction right and an
> infringement of the derivative work right is simply not the issue here.
> What we are interested in, rather, is whether a higher resolution work has
> additional creative expression which is protectable under copyright law.
> Because it is so easy to reach this threshold in the U.S., I believe it
> does.
If it does work this way, should it then be registered as a separate work?
>
> I should also mention that White-Smith was a case about whether piano rolls
> were protected by copyright as reproductions of a musical work. ; The court
> ruled that they were unprotected because they were not plainly perceivable
> by a human as the original work. ; But this human perception test has been
> overturned by statute. See Apple Computer v. Franklin Computer, 714
> F.2d1240 at 1248 (
> 3d.Cir. 1983); 17 USC 102. Moreover, the White-Smith decision occurred
> well before the current derivative work right was enacted in 1976.
>
> Dana
>
> On 1/26/07, drew Roberts < zotz100jamz.com">zotz100jamz.com> wrote:
>; > On Friday 26 January 2007 01:56 pm, Peter Brink wrote:
> > > Sorry for the late reply...
> > >
> > > Terry Hancock skrev:
>; > > > Peter Brink wrote:
>; > > >> A "work" must be the result of a creative act - the same
>; > > >> goes for derivative works. A mechanical transformation is in itself
>; > > >> not a creative act, the result of such a transformation is a copy
> >
> > and
> >
> > > >> not a derivative work. If I scan a picture and make two versions
> > > >> available, one in low resolution and one in high resolution, those
> > > >> two images are _copies_ of the _same work_.
> > > >
> > > > Perhaps so. This seems like a plausible, but debatable legal theory.
> > > > Can we clarify what jurisdiction(s) you feel this applies to? Your
> > > > email address suggests Sweden (at least that's what I think "se" is,
> > > > please correct me if I'm wrong).
> > >
> > > What we are talking about here is really what it takes for a thing to
> > > be a copy of a work. Common to (almost) all jurisdictions is that a
> > > copy is a reproduction, in any form, of the work (see also art. 9.1 of
> > > the Berne Convention). Then what is a reproduction? In the U.S. case
> > > White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co. (209
U.S. 1 (1908)) the
> > > concept of a copy was defined as follows: "[a] copy is that which comes
> > > so near to the original as to give to every person seeing it the idea
> > > created by the original". Substitute "seeing" with "perceiving"; and you
> > > get a statement with global relevance.
> > >
> > > It's pretty obvious (to me at least) that if a radio station plays a
> > > piece of music, using a high quality copy, and a listener tapes that
>; > > piece, then the listener has created a copy of the music played by the
> > > radio station. That the tape copy is of lower quality, i.e. that
> > > information was lost when the music was transmitted using radio waves,
> > > is really of no consequence. The file used by the radio station and the
> > > file on tape may not identical and to a computer they may appear to be
> > > different objects but to a person they are still copies of the same
>; > > work – and that's what matters. Every person hearing the copy played by
> > > the radio station and then hearing the copy on tape would say that they
> > > have heard the same piece of music.
> > >
> > > Just modifying a work a bit is not enough to turn it into a derivative
> > > work. If you have a low-resolution digital copy of a painting, and add
> > > information so that the result is a medium-resolution image, that every
> > > person seeing it would say is the same picture as the painting, then
> > > you still have a copy. It doesn't matter that you have used skill or
> > > made choices to produce the medium-resolution image – if it appears to
> > > be the same picture as the painting to an objective viewer, then it's a
> > > copy.
> > >
> > > Then, when does a thing quits being a copy and becomes an adaptation
> > > (or a derivative work)? It must be pointed out that it's very difficult
> > > to provide hard and fast rules for when a work is a copy and when it
> > > has been transformed so much that it's a derivative. This is something
> > > that courts decide on a case by case basis. As a general rule there
> > > must be a difference between the original and the adaptation and this
> > > difference must be perceivable by an objective person. In civil law
> > > jurisdictions an adaptation must be the result of a creative act, it
> > > obviously needs not be as original as the original work, but there must
> > > be some creativity involved in the formation of the work. In the
U.S. a
> > > derivative work must (in theory) be substantially different from the
> > > underlying work. The Feist decision would seem to imply that derivative
> > > works need to be the result of a minimum of creativity in the US too,
>; > > but that might be a false assumption on my part.
> > >
> > > In any case, in all jurisdictions the amount of difference needed
>; > > depends on a) what kind (or type) of work we are talking about and also
>; > > b) on how (relatively speaking) original the work is. A highly original
> > > work has in general a wider scope of protection as compared to a work
> > > of low originality. It takes more to create a derivative based on a
> > > piece of "art music"; then it takes to create a derivative based on, or
> > > even an original work inspired by, a piece of pop music.
>; > >
> > > The scope of protection afforded to a work must however end somewhere.
> > > At some point a derivative must cease to be a derivative | |