John Kelsey wrote:
> It's interesting to me that this same kind of issue
comes up in voting
> security, where computerized counting of hand-marked
paper ballots (or
> punched cards) has been and is being replaced with much
more
> user-friendly DREs, where paper poll books are being
replaced with
> electronic ones, etc. It's easy to have all your
procedures built
> around the idea that records X and Y come from
independent sources,
> and then have technology undermine that assumption.
The obvious
> example of this is rules for recounts and paper record
retention which
> are applied to DREs; the procedures make lots of sense
for paper
> ballots, but no sense at all for DREs. I wonder how
many other areas
> of computer and more general security have this same
kind of issue.
being slightly perverse ... there is the analogy with the
new england
net. at one point somebody went to the trouble to get
nine(?) 56kbit
circuits routed out of the new england area on nine distinct
physical
trunks (diverse routing, telco provisioning). however, over
a period of
years, nobody appeared to pay attention as the unique
circuits were
consolidated to fewer and fewer physical trunks. one day,
someplace in
conn., the new england net fell victim a backhoe denial of
service
attack (and the new england net was partitioned from the
rest of the
world for a couple of days).
so one might conjecture that the sox approach to the
opportunity is to
retrofit the complete length of the single physical trunk
with a bunker,
built to bank vault specifications ... as a countermeasure
to the
backhoe denial of service attack.
possibly the only "new" real countermeasure in
sox is the part about
informants ...
recently i was told that the typical sox bill for a small to
medium size
$25m corporation runs $800k.
misc. past sox references:
http://www.
garlic.com/~lynn/2006h.html#58 Sarbanes-Oxley
http://www.g
arlic.com/~lynn/2006i.html#1 Sarbanes-Oxley
http://www
.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm24.htm#35 Interesting bit of a
quote
http://www
.garlic.com/~lynn/aadsm24.htm#36 Interesting bit of a
quote
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