A note on vendor reaction speed to the e=3 problem

>  > RFC-2440 actually gives the exact bytes to use
for the
>  > ASN.1 stuff, which nicely cuts down on ambiguity.
> 
> This amounts to *not* using ASN.1 - treating the ASN.1
> data as mere arbitrary padding bits, devoid of
> information content.

Again, not quite right. You have to do a memcmp() and
make sure you've got the right arbitrary padding bits.

Anyway, the attack applies even if you throw away the
ASN.1 data. 

William

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     --
Whyte, William wrote:
 > Anyway, the attack applies even if you throw away the
 > ASN.1 data.

If you ignore the ASN.1 data you expect the hash to be
in a fixed byte position, so the attack does not apply.

     --digsig
          James A. Donald
      6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG
      qF2+GCfNPchHe4vzSkkYoOEjOI5i/kZtLIlyTUbX
      45tXJAuT/Tj9w0qpg0VFij8GrtY2JXG05fj6YE6M2

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