Thor Lancelot Simon wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 26, 2006 at 05:36:42PM +1300, Peter Gutmann
wrote:
>> In addition I've heard of evaluations where the
generator is required to use a
>> monotonically increasing counter (clock value) as
the seed, so you can't just
>> use the PRNG as a postprocessor for an entropy
polling mechanism. Then again
>> I know of some that have used it as exactly that
without any problems.
>
> This (braindamaged) requirements change was brought in
by the creation of
> a Known Answer Test for the cipher-based RNG. Prior to
the addition of
> that test, one could add additional entropy by changing
the seed value at
> each iteration of the generator. But that makes it, of
course, impossible
> to get Known Answers that confirm that the generator
actually imlements
> the standard. So suddenly the alternate form of the
generator -- in my
> opinion much less secure -- which uses a
monotonically-increasing counter
> for the seed, was the only permitted form.
>
> I have yet to hear of anyone who has found a test lab
that will certify
> a generator implementation that uses the mono counter
for the KAT suite
> but a random seed in normal operation. For good
reason, labs are usually
> very leery of algorithm implementations that come with
a "special test
> mode".
>
> However, you are free to change the actual key for the
generator as often
> as you like. I'm not sure why OpenSSL doesn't
implement "fork protection"
> that way, for example -- or does it use the MAC-based
generator instead?
No, it doesn't. Fork protection was originally implemented
inside the
"FIPS boundary" - which the test lab made us
remove. I guess it might be
possible to re-insert it outside the boundary, I'm not sure
that
occurred to us at the time. I seem to remember there was
some obstacle
to this, though, but I can't remember what it was.
While we're at it, an amusing fact I learnt about FIPS-140
while I was
implementing it for OpenSSL is that some of the Monte Carlo
tests have
output that's independent of the input.
Cheers,
Ben.
--
http://www.apache-
ssl.org/ben.html http://www.links.org/
"There is no limit to what a man can do or how far he
can go if he
doesn't mind who gets the credit." - Robert Woodruff
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