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Thread: Re: OT: SSL certificate chain problems
Re: OT: SSL certificate chain problems
country flaguser name
Netherlands		 2007-02-05 00:15:45 

  


  

    

Hi all,



I am looking for some information related
to PKCS #15, especially the "HOWTO" of setting up the file structures
and security data management (on IC Cards or "smart cards";).


Any relevant pointers towards this please
share here, thanks!







Best Regards,




Arun Varghese,

NXP Software, Block C, 4th Floor

MFAR Manyata Tech Park

Nagavara, Bangalore-560045

Tel : +91 80 4026 7000 Extn: 7817

Fax : +91 80 4026 7855

E-mail:arun.varghesenxp.com, 

www.software.nxp.com



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Victor Duchovni <Victor.DuchovniMorganStanley.com>


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2007-02-04 12:45 PM








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Subject


Re: OT: SSL certificate chain problems





Classification






















On Wed, Jan 31, 2007 at 01:57:04PM +1300, Peter Gutmann
wrote:



> Victor Duchovni <Victor.DuchovniMorganStanley.com> writes:

> 

> >What I don't understand is how the old (finally expired) root
helps to

> >validate the new unexpired root, when a verifier has the old root
and the

> >server presents the new root in its trust chain.

&gt; 

> You use the key in the old root to validate the self-signature in
the new

> root.  Since they're the same key, you know that the new root
supersedes the

> expired one.



Does this actually work with OpenSSL and v3 CA certs that have "X509v3

Authority Key Identifier" extensions? With these extensions present

(default when OpenSSL constructs CA certs, ...), certs whose serial number

does not match the "serial" field in the extension are not considered

to be root CA certs (not self-signed), and CA certs sharing the same

keys and DN, but carrying different serials, simply don't match.



If I roll-back the serial numbers and issue a cert with all the details

(including serial number, ...) the same, but just the start/end dates

changed to start before the expiration of the verifier's expired CA,

and end after today's date, the verifier ends up with a trust chain that

starts with the expired cert and fails, regardless of whether the server

sends the new root CA cert or not.



    CA0.pem:

    --------

    serial=C27B874157E381C0

    issuer= <fixed-ca-dn>


    subject= <fixed-ca-dn>


    notBefore=Jan  1 00:00:00 2007 GMT

    notAfter=Jan 31 00:00:00 2007 GMT

    ...

    X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:

                
keyid:CB:C0:45:68:F9:B0F:8B:A9:E9:EA:A0:F1:93:A1:C1:6B:7C:96:E4

                
DirName:<fixed-ca-dn&gt;

                
serial:C2:7B:87:41:57:E3:81:C0




    CA1.pem:

    --------

    serial=C27B874157E381C0

    issuer= <fixed-ca-dn>


    subject= <fixed-ca-dn>


    notBefore=Jan 15 00:00:00 2007 GMT

    notAfter=Feb 28 00:00:00 2007 GMT

    ...

    X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:

                
keyid:CB:C0:45:68:F9:B0F:8B:A9:E9:EA:A0:F1:93:A1:C1:6B:7C:96:E4

                
DirName:<fixed-ca-dn&gt;

                
serial:C2:7B:87:41:57:E3:81:C0




    SRV.pem:

    ---------

    serial=C27B874157E381C1

    issuer= <fixed-ca-dn>


    subject= <server-dn>

    notBefore=Jan 15 00:00:00 2007 GMT

    notAfter=Feb 28 00:00:00 2007 GMT

    ...

    X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:

                
keyid:CB:C0:45:68:F9:B0F:8B:A9:E9:EA:A0:F1:93:A1:C1:6B:7C:96:E4

                
DirName:<fixed-ca-dn&gt;

                
serial:C2:7B:87:41:57:E3:81:C0




A client with CAfile containing just "CA0.pem" fails to verify
a server

configured to send the SRV,CA1 trust chain. My verification callback is

called three times and produces:



  Trace: certificate verification depth=1 verify=0 subject=&lt;fixed-ca-dn>

  Error: CA certificate verification failed for <peer&gt; certificate
has expired



  Trace: certificate verification depth=1 verify=1 subject=&lt;fixed-ca-dn>




  Trace: certificate verification depth=0 verify=1 subject=&lt;server-dn>



If the verifier trusts the "CA1.pem" cert, I see instead:




  Trace: certificate verification depth=1 verify=1 subject=&lt;fixed-ca-dn>




  Trace: certificate verification depth=0 verify=1 subject=&lt;fixed-server-dn>



How does one construct a working (re-issued root CA) example with OpenSSL?


Am I setting this up incorrectly, or does OpenSSL not in fact support

establishing trust in re-issued root CA via now expired root CAs?



I have not tried to do this without the "issuer key identifier"
extension,

but don't really expect to find anything different...



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