Re: Failure of PKI in messaging

     --
 >> Suppose we have a messaging service that, like
Yahoo,
 >> is also a single signon service, ...

  John Levine wrote:
 > Then you just change the attack model.

My proposal closes off the major attack path, and leaves
the trojan and virus attack path wide open.

But I have not had a trojan or a virus for a year, and
the guys at OLPC and capabilities are working on
solutions to the problem of trojans and viruses.

     --digsig
          James A. Donald
      6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG
      KFNxwdPt55zr/lrMF3JJdyxCUs8vIC5/2XaKhzIj
      4+Jf1Ha6sL7LPQHFkrty0tw47vweiiGC5p1lMXXiK

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> >> Suppose we have a messaging service that, like
Yahoo,
> >> is also a single signon service, ...
>
>  John Levine wrote:
> > Then you just change the attack model.

>My proposal closes off the major attack path, and leaves
the trojan
>and virus attack path wide open.

It doesn't do anything about the obvious attack path of
phishing
credentials from the users to stick bogus trusted entries
into their
accounts.  My examples showed all sorts of benign looking
situations
in which users provide their credentials to parties of
unknown
identity or reliability.

R's,
John

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