Blackberries insecure?

According to the AP (which is quoting Le Monde),
"French government
defense experts have advised officials in France's corridors
of power
to stop using BlackBerry, reportedly to avoid snooping by
U.S.
intelligence agencies."

That's a bit puzzling.  My understanding is that email is
encrypted
from the organization's (Exchange?) server to the receiving
Blackberry,
and that it's not in the clear while in transit or on RIM's
servers.
In fact, I found this text on Blackberry's site:

	Private encryption keys are generated in a secure, two-way
	authenticated environment and are assigned to each
BlackBerry
	device user. Each secret key is stored only in the user's
secure
	regenerated by the user wirelessly.

	Data sent to the BlackBerry device is encrypted by the
	BlackBerry Enterprise Server using the private key
retrieved
	from the user's mailbox. The encrypted information travels
	securely across the network to the device where it is
decrypted
	with the key stored there.

	Data remains encrypted in transit and is never decrypted
outside
	of the corporate firewall.

Of course, we all know there are ways that keys can be
leaked.


		--Steve Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbi
a.edu/~smb

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Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
> According to the AP (which is quoting Le Monde),
"French government
> defense experts have advised officials in France's
corridors of power
> to stop using BlackBerry, reportedly to avoid snooping
by U.S.
> intelligence agencies."
> 
> That's a bit puzzling.  My understanding is that email
is encrypted
> from the organization's (Exchange?) server to the
receiving Blackberry,
> and that it's not in the clear while in transit or on
RIM's servers.

(quick reply) they specifically mentioned the servers:

"The ban has been prompted by SGDN concerns that the 
BlackBerry system is based on servers located in the US and

the UK,..."

https://financialcryptography.com/mt/archives/000856.ht
ml
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/dde45086-1e97-11dc-bc22
-000b5df10621.html

iang

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On 21 June 2007 04:41, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:

> According to the AP (which is quoting Le Monde),
"French government
> defense experts have advised officials in France's
corridors of power
> to stop using BlackBerry, reportedly to avoid snooping
by U.S.
> intelligence agencies."
> 
> That's a bit puzzling.  My understanding is that email
is encrypted
> from the organization's (Exchange?) server to the
receiving Blackberry,
> and that it's not in the clear while in transit or on
RIM's servers.
> In fact, I found this text on Blackberry's site:
> 
> 	Private encryption keys are generated in a secure,
two-way
> 	authenticated environment and are assigned to each
BlackBerry
> 	device user. Each secret key is stored only in the
user's secure
> 	regenerated by the user wirelessly.
> 
> 	Data sent to the BlackBerry device is encrypted by
the
> 	BlackBerry Enterprise Server using the private key
retrieved
> 	from the user's mailbox. The encrypted information
travels
> 	securely across the network to the device where it is
decrypted
> 	with the key stored there.
> 
> 	Data remains encrypted in transit and is never
decrypted outside
> 	of the corporate firewall.
> 
> Of course, we all know there are ways that keys can be
leaked.

  And work factors reduced.  And corporations who want to do
business in the
US  have been known to secretly collaborate with the US.gov
before to sabotage
encryption features on exported devices (e.g. Lotus, Crypto
AG, Microsoft,
Netscape).  So there's no reason to take the assurances on
the blackberry
website at face value, and if you're a government or other
.org that really
takes security /proper/ seriously, you've got to account for
the very real
risk.

    cheers,
      DaveK
-- 
Can't think of a witty .sigline today....

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On Wed, Jun 20, 2007 at 11:41:20PM -0400, Steven M. Bellovin
wrote:

> According to the AP (which is quoting Le Monde),
"French government
> defense experts have advised officials in France's
corridors of power
> to stop using BlackBerry, reportedly to avoid snooping
by U.S.
> intelligence agencies."
> 
> That's a bit puzzling.  My understanding is that email
is encrypted
> from the organization's (Exchange?) server to the
receiving Blackberry,
> and that it's not in the clear while in transit or on
RIM's servers.
> In fact, I found this text on Blackberry's site:

The key issue is who manages the (not necessarily, but often
Exchange)
mail store. Enterprise BlackBerry devices should be safe
from external
attacks, consumer BlackBerry devices use servers provisioned
elsewhere.

Are the officials using "Corporate" or
"Personal" BlackBerry devices?

-- 

 /" ASCII RIBBON                  NOTICE: If received
in error,
  / CAMPAIGN     Victor Duchovni  please destroy and
notify
  X AGAINST       IT Security,     sender. Sender does not
waive
 /  HTML MAIL    Morgan Stanley   confidentiality or
privilege,
                                   and use is prohibited.

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Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
> That's a bit puzzling.  My understanding is that email
is encrypted
> from the organization's (Exchange?) server to the
receiving Blackberry,
> and that it's not in the clear while in transit or on
RIM's servers.

Doesn't this run into the common problem of "supposedly
it's secure, but
they're not offering the source", just like with e.g.
Skype, TPM RNGs,
all commercial hardware security modules that I'm aware of,
etc?

Personally, I found a SymbianOS phone with a full keyboard
that's
lighter, thinner and more stylish than the Blackberry, runs
Python and
exposes most of the phone functionality to it through a set
of APIs, and
is happy to grab my mail via IMAP+SSL. With an unlimited
data plan, who
cares if it's pull instead of push e-mail?

-- 
Ivan Krstić <krsticsolarsail.hcs.harvard.edu> | GPG:
0x147C722D

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On Jun 20, 2007, at 8:41 PM, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:

> According to the AP (which is quoting Le Monde),
"French government
> defense experts have advised officials in France's
corridors of power
> to stop using BlackBerry, reportedly to avoid snooping
by U.S.
> intelligence agencies."
>
> That's a bit puzzling.  My understanding is that email
is encrypted
> from the organization's (Exchange?) server to the
receiving  
> Blackberry,
> and that it's not in the clear while in transit or on
RIM's servers.
> In fact, I found this text on Blackberry's site:
>

There have been rumors for years that the BlackBerry
protocol is  
compromised by some government or other. I've heard them for
years.  
Ultimately, no one knows, and there's no way to know. It
boils down  
to whether you trust RIM or not.

There is a PGP software package for the BlackBerry that will
further  
encrypt the content before it's sent out. I use it, and it's
quite  
nice. It cooperates really nicely with one of my PGP
Universal  
servers, as well. It's one of the best integrations of
crypto into a  
mail package I've ever seen.

However, you still have to trust RIM. I've never seen any of
the  
code, myself. and to my knowledge no one outside RIM has.
There are  
any number of ways that the implementation could be
compromised, with  
or without RIM's knowledge.

Paranoia is the *unwarranted* belief that people are out to
get you.  
The warranted belief that people are out to get you is
caution.  
Personally, I think that this is pure paranoid rumor and
innuendo.  
That doesn't mean it's wrong, it just means it's
unwarranted.

Last week, I got sent a posting on a web site that someone
made that  
said that he had secret knowledge that the USG could break
RSA for  
all key sizes that anyone uses, so you should just stop
using any  
cryptosystem that uses it. Of course, he couldn't tell us
anything  
more to protect the position of the person who told him
that. I said  
that if someone told you that an unidentified friend had
secret  
knowledge that banks were unsafe and so you shouldn't keep
keep your  
money there, your "I'm being scammed" hairs on the
back of your neck  
would stand up. But if some unidentified someone tells you
that the  
crypto's bad, it's met with complete credulity.

I have no doubt that people in various governments want to
spy on  
high-ranking French. Duh.

But what's more likely, that there are secret government
compromises  
of security, or that there's a secret disinformation
campaign with  
the goal of convincing these people that the crypto is
compromised.  
Of course, the really delicious theory is that they've
compromised  
the crypto and then started the disinformation campaign in
order to  
get people like me to discredit the disinformation campaign
and thus  
reassure people that the crypto isn't broken, when in fact
it is. Is  
this paranoid, or merely cautious?

	Jon



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