To add to the reference, a preprint is available online at
http://www.dtc.umn.edu/~odlyzko/doc/arch/prime.d
iscrete.logs.pdf
A companion paper that was used crucially in the solution,
"Solving
large sparse linear systems over finite fields," pp.
109-133 in
"Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO '90," A. J.
Menezes and S. A. Vanstone
(eds.), Springer Verlag, Lecture Notes in Computer Science
#537 (1991)
is available at
http://www.dtc.umn.edu/~odlyzko/doc/arch/sparse.li
near.eqs.pdf
Andrew Odlyzko, http://www.dtc.umn.ed
u/~odlyzko
> On Fri Oct 12, Steve Bellovin wrote:
On Thu, 11 Oct 2007 21:50:06 -0700
Bill Stewart <bill.stewart pobox.com> wrote:
>
> > > | Which is by the way exactly the case with
SecureIM. How
> > > | hard is it to brute-force 128-bit DH ? My
"guesstimate"
> > > | is it's an order of minutes or even
seconds, depending
> > > | on CPU resources.
>
> Sun's "Secure NFS" product from the 1980s
had 192-bit Diffie-Hellman,
> and a comment in one of the O'Reilly NFS books says
that
> "However, by 1990, advances in RISC
processors produced
> workstation machines that could, by brute
force,
> derive the private key from any public key
in under a day."
> but that in 1987 there were still a lot of Motorola
68010 machines
> that took several minutes to generate keys so they
didn't want it
> longer. I'm guessing that a 1990 RISC machine was
around 50 MIPS,
> so it's maybe 1/100 the speed of a modern single-core
CPU.
>
> 128-bit DH sounds like as good a decision as using
40-bit RC4 keys
> would be today.
>
It wasn't just brute force, it was math.
Article{ nfscrack,
author = {Brian A. LaMacchia and Andrew M.
Odlyzko},
journal = {Designs, Codes, and Cryptography},
pages = ,
title = {Computation of Discrete Logarithms in
Prime Fields},
volume = ,
year = ,
annote = {Describes how the authors cryptanalyzed
Secure RPC.}
}
--Steve Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbi
a.edu/~smb
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