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Thread: Re: Hushmail in U.S. v. Tyler Stumbo




Re: Hushmail in U.S. v. Tyler Stumbo
user name
2007-11-02 00:17:24
Jon Callas <joncallas.org> writes:

> Hushmail is not a scam.  They do a very good job of
explaining what
> they do, what they cannot do, and against which threats
they
> protect.  You may quibble all you want with its
*effectiveness* but
> they are not a scam.  A scam is being dishonest.

Failure to tell the whole truth is a form of dishonesty,
just as is
telling a lie.

By silently, implicitly adopting a narrow definition of
"security",
Hush are able to claim "Only Hush's solution provides
such a high
level of security combined with total ease of use."
[1]

The larger truth is that a consequence of using Hushmail is
that
record of when, with whom, and the size of each
communication is
available to Hush, even though the content is concealed.

According to the original poster, it's these kinds of data
that
Hushmail was required to turn over to the US DEA.


 -- StealthMonger
	 <StealthMongerhod.aarg.net>
	 <StealthMongernym.panta-rhei.eu.org>
	 <StealthMongernym.alias.net>

 --
   stealthmail: Scripts to hide whether you're doing email,
or when,
   or with whom.  http://stealthsui
te.afflictions.org

[1] http://www.hushmail
.com/about-how

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Re: Hushmail in U.S. v. Tyler Stumbo
country flaguser name
United States
2007-11-06 14:09:53

StealthMonger wrote:
[snip]

> The larger truth is that a consequence of using
Hushmail is that
> record of when, with whom, and the size of each
communication is
> available to Hush, even though the content is
concealed.

So the obvious point is that Hushmail, and systems like it,

become "concentrators" and possible single points
of failure.

If, on the other hand, you handled your own PKI to send 
symmetrical keys to your correspondents and managed the keys
with 
something like StrongKey, then one could use a vast number
of 
ISPs/SMTP points so that they may never get a clear path of
send 
and reply through a single ISP.

As Jon Callas said, "If the system is strong, it all
comes down 
to your operational security."

Security is not a thing, it is a process that uses tools and

procedures to accomplish the goal. As I like to say,
"Security is 
lot like democracy - everyone's for it but few understand
that 
you have to work at it constantly."

Best,

Allen


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