StealthMonger wrote:
[snip]
> The larger truth is that a consequence of using
Hushmail is that
> record of when, with whom, and the size of each
communication is
> available to Hush, even though the content is
concealed.
So the obvious point is that Hushmail, and systems like it,
become "concentrators" and possible single points
of failure.
If, on the other hand, you handled your own PKI to send
symmetrical keys to your correspondents and managed the keys
with
something like StrongKey, then one could use a vast number
of
ISPs/SMTP points so that they may never get a clear path of
send
and reply through a single ISP.
As Jon Callas said, "If the system is strong, it all
comes down
to your operational security."
Security is not a thing, it is a process that uses tools and
procedures to accomplish the goal. As I like to say,
"Security is
lot like democracy - everyone's for it but few understand
that
you have to work at it constantly."
Best,
Allen
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