Re: PunchScan voting protocol

On 12/12/07, John Denker <jsdav8n.com> wrote:
> Several important steps in the process must be carried
out in
> secret, and if there is any leakage, there is unbounded
potential
> for vote-buying and voter coercion.

I've done quite a bit of work with this protocol. The
protocol assumes
the existence of an Election Authority. The Authority has
the master
keys required to generate certain data sets, and these keys
give the
Authority the ability to associate ballot numbers with
votes. Note
that this doesn't necessarily give the Authority the ability
to
associate people with votes.

There are no per-ballot keys, so there is no partial
exposure risk.
It's all-or-nothing.

> 1) It would be nice to see some serious cryptological
protection
> of election processes and results.

> 2b) In particular I don't think PunchScan really solves
"the"
> whole problem.

What is "the" whole problem? Please provide an
attack model.

-- 
Taral <taralxgmail.com>
"Please let me know if there's any further trouble I
can give you."
    -- Unknown

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