Jari Arkko <mailto:jari.arkko piuha.net> supposedly
scribbled:
> Glen Zorn (gwz) wrote:
>
>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>> The problem is that since EMSK is the root, its
compromise will lead
>>> to the compromise of all derived keys. This
also holds locally for
>>> the AMSK_root_0 approach. That is, if
AMSK_root_0 is compromised
>>> then any keys derived from that root are
compromised (but not keys
>>> in
>>> other apps).
>>>
>>>
>>
>> I guess I'm just confused, then (not a first!). I
thought that the
>> major problem was that it is basically impossible
to no which (if
>> any) _applications_ a person would choose to use
during a session.
>> If that is accurate, I can't really see how the
AMSK_root_0 approach
>> solves the problem. If that's not the problem,
what is?
>>
>>
> Oh. Maybe I was confused. AMSK_root_0 does not solve
that problem. It
> solves the problem that if your application requires
multiple keys
> (as in fast handoff to AP2, AP3, etc) then you still
only need one
> AMSK from the EMSK for the application. That
AMSK_root_0 can then be
> used to generate all the keys that the application in
question needs.
OK, I guess I just assumed that the "M" in
"AMSK" implied that usage.
>
> --Jari
Hope this helps,
~gwz
Why is it that most of the world's problems can't be
solved by simply
listening to John Coltrane? -- Henry Gabriel
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