Issue 351: Incomplete EAP Pre-authentication discussion
Submitter name: Bernard Aboba
Submitter email address: aboba internaut.com
Date Submitted: April 21, 2006
Reference:
Document: Keying-12
Comment type: T
Priority: 1
Section: 4.1
Rationale/Explanation of issue:
It has been pointed out (in
draft-vidya-eap-keying-gap-analysis as well as
discussion in the HOAKEY BOF) that there are a number of
issues raised by
EAP pre-authentication. Section 4 includes EAP
pre-authentication in a list
of handoff techniques and claims that "The sections
that follow discuss the
security vulnerabilities introduced by the above
mechanisms." However,
Section 4 does not include a discussion of EAP
pre-authentication concerns.
The proposed resolution is to add a Section 4.1, with the
following text:
"4.1 EAP Pre-authentication
EAP pre-authentication enables an EAP peer to
pre-establish EAP keying
material with
an authenticator prior to attaching to it. Where there is
sufficient time
to pre-establish
keying material prior to changing the point of attachment,
this may enable
the peer to
remove EAP authentication from the critical path for
handoff, reducing
latency.
EAP pre-authentication exchanges typically differ from a
normal EAP
conversation only
with respect to the lower layer encapsulation. For
example, in
[IEEE-802.11i], EAP
pre-authentication frames are encapsulated within a
distinct Ethertype,
but otherwise
conform to the encapsulation described in [IEEE-802.1X].
As a result, an
EAP
pre-authentication conversation that eventually results in
establishment
of security
associations differs little from the model described in
Section 1.3, other
than the
potential introduction of a delay between Phase 1 and
Phase 2. However,
since
a peer may complete EAP pre-authentication with an
authenticator without
eventually
attaching to it, it is possible that Phase 2 will not
occur.
[RFC3580] describes only minor differences in the AAA
exchange occurring
as a result of EAP pre-authentication as compared with an
ordinary EAP
authentication
exchange. For example, since in 802.11i an Association
exchange does
not occur prior to EAP pre-authentication, the SSID is not
yet
known. As a result, an Access-Request generated as the
result of pre-authentication cannot include the SSID
within the Called-Station-Id attribute as described in
[RFC3580] Section 3.20. Since a peer may never
associate with an authenticator to which it
pre-authenticated,
an Accounting-Request signifying the start of service may
never be sent, or may only be sent with a substantial
delay
after the completion of authentication.
Since an EAP pre-authentication exchange differs from an
EAP
authentication exchange
only in subtle ways, the backend authentication server may
not be aware of
whether it is engaging in a pre-authentication exchange,
resulting in operational or security problems. For
example,
where the authenticator does not include the SSID within
the
Called-Station-Id
attribute in ordinary requests, pre-authentication
requests
may appear indistinguishable. As a result, the backend
authentication server may not be able to correctly
calculate
the simultaneous sessions in progress, either preventing
successful completion of pre-authentication or enabling
the peer to engage in more simultaneous sessions than
they are authorized for.
In order to allow backend authentication servers to handle
pre-authentication requests more reliably, it is
recommended
that EAP pre-authentication requests be explicitly
identified
within AAA protocols. Also, in order to supress
unnecessary
EAP pre-authentication exchanges, it is recommended that
authenticators unambiguously identify themselves as
described
in Section 2.2.1, allowing the peer to determine whether
it
has previously established EAP keying material with that
authenticator."
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