I think, rsh is quite obsolete

Dave Mitchell <davemiabyn.com> writes:

>> Just as with NFS for example. Is NFS evil too?
>
> Basic NFS is pretty evil. Totally insecure.

Well, it looks like most local traffic here uses evil things

I imagine TFTP isn't less evil and perhaps only FTP is worse
(cleartext passwords over the wire and firewall problems).
And
Samba (especially with unencrypted passwords) and X and...

> The rsh protocol requires the server to make a second
TCP connection back
> to a low-numbered ephemeral port specified by the
client, for the stderr
> channel.

Nope, that's optional.

> If you haven't got a stateful, inspecting firewall,
you're hosed.

Even with stderr all you'd need is a simple helper.

Anyway most people use rsh* over physically secure networks.
Password-less privileged access with source IP access
control over
public network? No, thanks.
-- 
Krzysztof Halasa

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