Re: Self-signed certs

Nelson Bolyard wrote:
> I am not the one who proposes that we should abandon
CAs for SSH-style
> cert management.  The person who has repeatedly
proposed that is not
> presently participating in this discussion, but it
appears to be his
> life mission to do whatever it takes to see that
proposal come to pass.
>
> I am trying to get people to think of the consequences.
 People who think
> that massive MITM attacks are impractical don't know
about Netsetter.
>   

OK, that is fine.

Can you give a name? Because you replied to *me*, and made
it appear 
that your scenario applies to *my* proposal, which is
certainly does not 
at all.

> I will also point out that if you let self-signed certs
work as quietly as
> certs from legitimate CAs, nothing will stop banks from
using self-signed
> certs.
> I agree that the proposal to use SSH style cert
management is total nonsense.
>   

OK, just to clarify (I have already mentioned that in
previous posts):

I think it's "total nonsense" to treat self-signed
certs the same as 
verified CA-issued certs (emphasis on verified  ).

I *do* think that storing certs seen and demanding that they
are used in 
the future for that site is a good idea, and would
considerably improve 
SSL security, because it puts CAs out of the picture between
repeat 
visitors (95+% of all usage), CAs only provide the *initial*
trust, 
which I think reflects reality. It means that a Class 1
can't get 
between a user and a Class 3 bank cert, and VeriSign can't
get between 
me and web.de which uses trustcenter.de or whatever.

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