On Fri, 16 Feb 2007, Eric Gauthier wrote:
> I run the network for a University with about 12,000
students and 12,000
> computers in our dormitories. We, like many other
Universities, have spent the
> last five or six years putting systems in place that
are both reactive and
> preventative. From my perspective, the issues are
still there but I'm not
> sure that I agree with your implications.
>
> Do we still have "compromised" systems?
Yes.
> Is the number of "compromosed" systems at any
time large? No.
> Is the situation out of control? No.
>
> Email me off-list if you want more details. IMHO, Its
too bad broadband
> providers have not yet picked up on what the
Universities have done.
Why do you claim broadband providers haven't picked up on
what
universities have done?
Couldn't broadband providers say the same thing
> Do we still have "compromised" systems?
Yes.
> Is the number of "compromosed" systems
at any time large? No.
> Is the situation out of control? No.
If you compare infection rates of a broadband provider with
10 million
subscribers, which probably translates to at least 30
million devices with
NAT, WiFi and mobile devices; would its infection rate be
significantly
different from a university with 12,000 students with 1
computer each?
If your university's upstream ISP implemented a policy of
cutting off the
university's Internet connection anytime a device in the
university
network was compromised; how many hours a year would the
university
be down? What if the university's ISP had a three-strikes
policy, would
the university have used up all of its three-strikes? What
proof should
the univeristy's upstream ISP accept the problem is
corrected?
Is there some infection rate of university networks that
upstream ISPs
should accept as "normal?" Or should ISPs have a
zero-tolorance policy
for universities becoming infected repeatedly?
How is the "acceptable" infection rate for
universities different than the
infection rate of other types of networks?
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