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> The draft-dukes-ike-mode-cfg-02 specifies that a mode
config
> transaction takes place "once the ISAKMP security
association has been
> established" and "the derivation of the
initialization vector IV for
> the first message, used with SKEYID_e to encrypt the
message" is
> described in Appendix B of RFC2049. However it's still
not clear
> whether the IV vector should be generated as for Phase1
or Phase2, as
> the mode config exchange takes place between the two.
Openswan decides
> to use Phase1 initialization vector IV, SoftRemote uses
Phase2
> initialization vector IV, which is the cause of
confusion and cause
> "malformed packet" messages in SoftRemote
logs, when openswan attempts
> to send MODECFG SET packets.
You can't use the phase 2 IV because there is no phase 2
yet.
You never use a phase 2 IV to initialize a new exchange
(indicated by
a new messageid). That just doesn't make sense. It sounds
like
SoftRemote has never been to a bakeoff.
I'll bet the client can't rekey properly.
SoftRemote has clearly confused themselves, because they
have decided to
start the phase 2 negotiation even though the phase 1.5 (the
modecfg)
is not yet finished. This is clear from your next part:
> When the initialization vector issue was fixed,
SoftRemote started to
> parse modeconfig packets properly. But the latter
conversation was
> still failing - because of silent abandoning the
already initiated
> IPsec SA conversation by SoftRemote (after the virtual
interface with
> the new IP address was up). SoftRemote attempted to
start a new IPsec
> SA conversation, what wasn't properly handled on the
server side.
Nor should it be.
You can't propose a proper phase 2 until you know what IP
address the
client should propose. You can't do that until the modecfg
is over.
- --
] Bear: "Me, I'm just the shape of a
bear." | firewalls [
] Michael Richardson, Xelerance Corporation, Ottawa, ON
|net architect[
] mcr xelerance.com http://www.san
delman.ottawa.on.ca/mcr/ |device driver[
] panic("Just another Debian GNU/Linux using, kernel
hacking, security guy"); [
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