On Thu, 17 Jan 2008 13:09:34 +0100, Christian Heimes
<lists cheimes.de> wrote:
>Jean-Paul Calderone wrote:
>> If it should, I think the PEP should explain the
attack this defends
>> against in more detail. The current brief mention
of "security issues"
>> is a bit hand-wavey. For example, what is the
relationship between
>> security, this feature, and the PYTHONPATH
environment variable? Isn't
>> the attack of putting malicious code into a user
site-packages directory
>> the same as the attack of putting it into a
directory in PYTHONPATH?
>
>The PYTHONPATH env var has the same security
implications. However a
>user has multiple ways to avoid problems. For example
the user can use
>the -E flag or set up sudo to ignore the environment.
I'm not sure how sudo gets involved. sudo doesn't set the
euid, it sets
the uid. This is about programs with the setuid bit set.
(I assume this
doesn't also apply to Python programs that explicitly make
use of the
seteuid() call, since this will probably only be checked at
interpreter
startup before any Python application code has run.)
>
>The uid and gid tests aren't really required. They just
provide an extra
>safety net if a user forgets to add the -s flag to a
suid app.
It's not much of a safety net if PYTHONPATH still allows
injection of
arbitrary code. It's just needless additional complexity
for no benefit.
On the other hand, if all of the other mechanisms for
modifying how
imports work is also made to behave this way, then maybe
there's a point.
Jean-Paul
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