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Thread: Re: Design issues for access-control




Re: Design issues for access-control
user name
2007-11-05 10:05:49
* Anne van Kesteren wrote:
>You already said that. I'm not sure how you think that
helps.

I think Thomas read you as saying it's good practise if
authors of web
services that handle POST requests secure their service
against cross-
site <form> submissions, but do not secure them
against cross-site XHR
requests, whereas you were really saying, authors have to do
the former
and might not currently do the latter, independent of good
practises.

His point is that you really have to secure them against
both, whatever
that may mean for a particular service, so there is no
difference from
the perspective of the author's site. The relevance of your
distinction
to the discussion is that one wants to minimize the ways in
which web
browsers can be used to attack poorly secured web services,
and Thomas
was asking to which degree this actually has security
benefits.
-- 
Björn Höhrmann · mailto:bjoernhoehrmann.de · http://bjoern.hoehrmann.de

Weinh. Str. 22 · Telefon: +49(0)621/4309674 · http://www.bjoernsworld.de

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Re: Design issues for access-control
user name
2007-11-05 12:18:42
Bjoern Hoehrmann wrote:
> * Anne van Kesteren wrote:
>> You already said that. I'm not sure how you think
that helps.
> 
> I think Thomas read you as saying it's good practise if
authors of web
> services that handle POST requests secure their service
against cross-
> site <form> submissions, but do not secure them
against cross-site XHR
> requests, whereas you were really saying, authors have
to do the former
> and might not currently do the latter, independent of
good practises.
> 
> His point is that you really have to secure them
against both, whatever
> that may mean for a particular service, so there is no
difference from
> the perspective of the author's site. The relevance of
your distinction
> to the discussion is that one wants to minimize the
ways in which web
> browsers can be used to attack poorly secured web
services, and Thomas
> was asking to which degree this actually has security
benefits.

Why do you have to currently check for cross-site XHR POST
requests? I 
would argue that you don't, and that there very likely are
servers out 
there that don't. Thus, if we simply allowed cross-site XHR
POST 
requests we'd make such servers vulnerable whereas they
didn't used to.

I agree that there very likely are servers out there that
are vulnerable 
to cross site <form> POST requests. That is bad, but I
don't think that 
is anything we can nor should do anything about here.

/ Jonas


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