RE: Incentives (RE: In the news (Georgia State)

> . . . the main rationale for using IRs to promote OA .
. . Does 
> anyone have a good answer?

Not actually a direct answer, good or otherwise, to the
question 
as formulated, but . . .

Couldn't one rightly maintain that *library* administrators'

(perceived) self-interest and drive for self-legitimation
and 
self-profiling -- within their respective universities, to
the 
extent that the library's the instigator of, and/or the (or
one) 
party that operates, the IR-regime -- are a factor with some
( or 
quite a bit of?) explanatory force?  This is something you
see 
all over, isn't it ?

- Laval Hunsucker
Amsterdam


-----Oorspronkelijk bericht-----
Van: owner-liblicense-llists.yale.edu
[mailto:owner-liblicense-llists.yale.edu]Namens Sandy
Thatcher
Verzonden: dinsdag 29 april 2008 0:31
Aan: liblicense-llists.yale.edu
Onderwerp: Re: Incentives (RE: In the news (Georgia State)

Rick's question suggests another: the main rationale for
using 
IRs to promote OA seems to be that universities have a
strong 
interest in exhibiting the research that their faculties
produce, 
but do administrators really believe that?  Is an
administrator 
at a state university testifying before a legislative
hearing and 
trying to get more funding going to point to all that
research on 
the IR as a reason for the state to increase its financial 
support? And just how would this kind of demonstration work?
And 
who are private universities trying to impress? Members of 
Congress whose votes are needed to increase funding for NIH,

Defense Department research, etc.? Are universities perhaps

trying to impress each other so as to raid one another for
their 
best faculty? It is just unclear to me what this presumed 
self-interest universities have in their IRs really amounts
to, 
and how it can actually be put to practical use. Does anyone
have 
a good answer?

--Sandy Thatcher, Penn State Press